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Mineral and hydrocarbon extraction and infrastructure are increasingly significant drivers of forest loss, greenhouse gas emissions,
and threats to the rights of forest communities in forested areas of
Amazonia, Indonesia, and Mesoamerica. Projected investments in
these sectors suggest that future threats to forests and rights are
substantial, particularly because resource extraction and infrastructure reinforce each other and enable population movements and
agricultural expansion further into the forest. In each region, governments have made framework policy commitments to national and
cross-border infrastructure integration, increased energy production,
and growth strategies based on further exploitation of natural
resources. This reflects political settlements among national elites
that endorse resource extraction as a pathway toward development.
Regulations that protect forests, indigenous and rural peoples’ lands,
and conservation areas are being rolled back or are under threat.
Small-scale gold mining has intensified in specific locations and also
has become a driver of deforestation and degradation. Forest dwellers’ perceptions of insecurity have increased, as have documented
homicides of environmental activists. To explain the relationships
among extraction, infrastructure, and forests, this paper combines a
geospatial analysis of forest loss overlapped with areas of potential
resource extraction, interviews with key informants, and feedback
from stakeholder workshops. The increasing significance of resource
extraction and associated infrastructure as drivers of forest loss and
rights violations merits greater attention in the empirical analyses and
conceptual frameworks of Sustainability Science.
extractive industry

and semiarid forest are sites of significant known and potential
mineral, oil, coal, and natural gas reserves. These forest areas are
also set to receive significant investment in infrastructure designed
to support resource extraction and the large-scale cultivation of oil
palm, soybeans, sugar cane, and other crops (3–5). In 2014, the
G20 (Group of 20: an international forum for the governments
and central bank governors from Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, India,
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South
Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the
United States) committed to invest up to an additional $90 trillion
in global infrastructure by 2030 and in 2016 committed to link
infrastructure master plans across world regions (6). In Kalimantan and Sumatra (Indonesia), the volume of foreign direct
investment directed toward infrastructure development and extractive industry is five times greater than international funding for
forest conservation through mechanisms such as REDD+ (efforts
to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) in
Significance
While infrastructure expansion has been broadly investigated
as a driver of deforestation, the impacts of extractive industry
and its interactions with infrastructure investment on forest
cover are less well studied. These challenges are urgent given
growing pressure for infrastructure investment and resource
extraction. We use geospatial and qualitative data from Amazonia, Indonesia, and Mesoamerica to explain how infrastructure
and extractive industry lead directly and indirectly to deforestation,
forest degradation, and increasingly precarious rights for forest
peoples. By engaging in explicit analyses of community rights, the
politics of development policy, and institutions for transparency,
anticorruption, and the defense of human rights, Sustainability Science could be more effective in examining deforestation and related
climate-change impacts and in contributing to policy innovation.

| infrastructure | deforestation | rights | climate

T

he expansion of large- and small-scale agriculture has been
identified as a primary driver of forest loss and degradation
and related global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (1). In
contrast, the impacts of extractive industry and infrastructure
expansion, and especially the links between the two, have received less explicit treatment. The relationships between the
protection or violation of human rights and the associated conservation or conversion of forests in the context of such economic
projects have also received little analytical attention, particularly
in Sustainability Science. This paper presents evidence on the
current and projected significance of extractive industry and associated infrastructure investment to argue that Sustainability and
Land System Science should be more explicit in addressing the
relationships among resource extraction, rights, and land use in
empirical and conceptual analyses of forest loss and emissions.
Investment in the global mining and hydrocarbon sectors
(hereafter referred to as “resource extraction”) continues to be
significant (2). The world’s remaining areas of extensive humid
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Resource Extraction, Infrastructure, Forests, and Emissions
Our analysis draws on much previous work establishing the relationship between changes in land use and land cover and GHG
emissions (15). By examining the relationship between infrastructure, resource extraction, and forest loss, we may also draw
Bebbington et al.
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conclusions about the pathways through which these sectors
drive climate change and about the institutional and sociopolitical interactions that underpin these relationships (Fig. 1).
Infrastructure’s contributions to emissions are better studied
than the contributions of resource extraction (5, 16–20). The
greatest impacts are indirect, and much of the forest loss and landcover change that sustainability scientists document as resulting
from agricultural expansion and in-migration are facilitated by the
construction of roads, railways, port facilities, and waterways (1, 3,
21–23). Although dams are often invoked as important elements
for reducing reliance on fossil fuel-based energy (16), the infrastructure expansion required to build dams, in addition to the
release of methane from submerged vegetation, may result in a
net contribution to emissions in tropical zones (18, 24). Furthermore, infrastructure relies on cement, the third largest single
source of anthropogenic GHG emissions (25).
While some mineral extraction will be key for the deployment
of new energy technologies for low-carbon futures (26–28), resource extraction also contributes to increases in emissions.
Mining and hydrocarbons operations emit GHGs directly, including through heavy machinery use, flaring of associated gases,
and dependence on increasingly energy-intensive technologies to
enable the development of deeper and more remote seams.
Ocean shipping of extractives releases GHGs and other toxic air
pollutants. The end use of many of the products of these sectors,
especially hydrocarbons, accounts for substantial shares of GHG
emissions globally. By comparison, the direct contribution of
resource extraction to GHG emissions through impacts on landcover change and forest loss is relatively modest; however, the
indirect impacts are more extensive, as indicated by our regional
case studies (SI Appendix). The effects on forest degradation and
loss reach well beyond the mine site. The mine and associated
infrastructure encourage in-migration, new human settlements,
and other economic activities that involve forest clearing (29, 30).
In cases where coal deposits are mined from beneath dense, humid forest (as in Kalimantan and Sumatra), the contribution of
this coal to increased emissions comes both from its burning and
from the clearance of forest and consequent loss of a carbon sink.
Infrastructure and natural resource extraction are often linked
synergistically. The possibility of resource extraction can strengthen
the financial case for investment in access and energy infrastructure,
while the presence of such infrastructure renders investment in
resource extraction more viable (31). Mega-projects of resource
extraction in remote forest locations, such as the S11D iron ore
project in the Brazilian Amazon, the IndoMet Coal Project in
Kalimantan, or the Cobre-Panama copper mine in Panama, also
include investment in large-scale access and energy infrastructure.
These synergies drive legal and institutional reforms that change
how forests are governed and have led to reductions in protectedarea status, weakened the protection of indigenous and traditional
peoples’ territories, diluted environmental assessment procedures,
and increased deforestation rates (32, 33).
As infrastructure and the resource extraction and agricultural
investment enabled by new infrastructure make new claims on
forests, they enter into direct competition with prior land uses,
including forest conservation and territorial claims. The relative
pressure of these different activities on forest cover depends on
underlying drivers: economic conditions affecting the relative
returns to each form of land use; policy drivers favoring one land
user over another; and political relationships determining the
power of different land users and stakeholders to influence
policy drivers (34, 35). Land speculation processes that typically
follow or even anticipate the announcement of possible largescale investments in infrastructure or resource extraction also
contribute to forest clearance and rights violations (19, 36).
How much forest is cleared depends on the sets of rights and
rights holders that control the use of forest lands. Rights claims
over forests are disputed through different mechanisms: policy

SUSTAINABILITY
SCIENCE

the very same regions. This scenario suggests that threats to forest
cover from resource extraction and infrastructure will increase and
that there is an urgent need to revise legislation, policy, and institutions ahead of this coming avalanche of investments. These
forests are often areas of long-term occupation and use by indigenous and traditional peoples. Frequently, these are contested
landscapes even before the incursion of new investment in infrastructure and resource extraction. Such investment exacerbates
existing conflicts and creates new ones (7, 8), reflected in the most
extreme cases by the killings of environmental defenders. Globally,
200 such killings were reported in 2016, and 207 were reported in
2017, the majority linked to contestations over mining, logging,
hydropower, agro-industrial, and infrastructure projects (9–11).
Important parts of the world’s remaining humid tropical forest
are concentrated in Amazonia, Indonesia (Sumatra, Kalimantan,
and Papua), and Mesoamerica [Central America and Southern
Mexico (12)]. Here we ask what is the impact of investment in
resource extraction and infrastructure on forest loss and on
rights violations of forest-dependent populations in these regions; what are possible future impacts of such investments; and
what are the factors driving these future impacts? We focus on
transportation and power-generation infrastructure and on
minerals mining and hydrocarbons development. We hypothesize that there is frequently a link between the shape and direction of infrastructure development and resource extraction
priorities, especially given the transportation and energy demands of resource extraction. We also hypothesize that levels of
protection of human and community rights related to expanding
infrastructure and extraction provide an important indicator of
possible deforestation trends in the future. We consider the role
of national political settlements (agreements among national
elites regarding the distribution of opportunities and power in
society) and resulting development-policy agreements in driving
patterns of investment and rights protection. We do not address
the important macroeconomic effects of oil and mineral dependence on deforestation rates (13).
The contested nature of forests and the violation of rights in
forest landscapes challenge Land System Science and other
traditions within Sustainability Science to offer analyses of landcover change that (i) build models of land change in which rights
understood broadly (i.e., not only as tenure rights but also as
citizenship and human rights) occupy an analytically central
position and (ii) find ways of addressing the relationships between forest loss, community rights, and drivers of land-cover
change in ways that facilitate a rigorous public discussion of diverse pathways toward human and environmental flourishing in
forest-rich regions. Addressing the first challenge will allow
analyses that contribute to rights-based pathways to sustainability; addressing the second opens channels from science to policy
that pass through the public sphere and relationships of democratic accountability. Contextual factors also make this an opportune moment to engage in such work. These include donor
discussions of sustainable infrastructure aligned with the delivery
of sustainable development goals and climate-change mitigation
(14); civil society activism around national climate-change commitments; national efforts to secure Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development membership; high-level discussions
of the need for comprehensive approaches to business and development, especially related to extractive industry; and the fallout of
international corruption scandals that pressure business and government to enhance transparency in the contracting of infrastructure and extractive industry investments.
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Fig. 1. The relationships among extraction, infrastructure, and emissions.

efforts to redefine rights in favor of a particular type of land user;
the use of legal and litigation procedures to contest policy
and protect rights through the courts; and efforts to frame public
and policy debate in favor of specific rights and rights holders.
Research shows that direct, titled control of resources by

Fig. 2.

indigenous peoples and communities can reduce deforestation
and carbon emissions, as can the existence of protected areas
(37, 38). In addition to being an inherent good in itself, protection of the human, citizenship, and resource-tenure rights of
these peoples is therefore a critical instrument for sustaining

Deforestation, extraction, and land use in Brazil (Right) and Peru (Left).
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Results

extraction activity and forest loss in the Amazon basin (Fig. 2),
with the following principal exceptions. In Brazil, the “arc of
deforestation” extending from Pará across Mato Grosso and
Rondônia is characterized by the presence of exploration concessions and operating mines in Eastern Pará and in Rondônia.
Another 1.5 million ha of forest in Pará and Maranhão, including
in quilombola and indigenous communities, have been lost due
to charcoal making in support of the iron complex at Gran
Carajás (44). The curvilinear area of deforestation in Southeastern Peru is the consequence of extensive artisanal and smallscale gold mining (ASGM) in Madre de Dios (45).
Currently 327 oil or gas blocks are available for bidding or are
under exploration in the Amazon Basin (covering some 108
million ha). Mining concessions cover a further 160 million ha,
∼21% of the basin’s total area (46). Most protected areas and
indigenous territories are threatened by hydro-power/waterway
development, mining, oil and gas, and road investment. Overlaps
of mining and other resource extraction rights with protected
areas represent a real future risk either from degazettement of
protected areas or simply from increased local pressure on forest
cover (47, 48). In Brazil, applications for and approvals of mining
concessions have moved steadily west- and northwards, and the
state of Amazonas, the principal remaining area of primary
forest in the Brazilian Amazon, is now ringed on three sides by
mining concessions or requests for concessions. Infrastructure
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Spatial Patterns of Forest Loss and Resource Extraction by Region.
Amazon. To date there is no direct relationship between resource-
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400 km

Planned infrastructure expansion in the Brazilian Amazon.
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plans show a similar extension further into the currently forested
areas of the basin (Fig. 3).
Indonesia. Between the years 2000 and 2014 in Sumatra, 71.8% of
deforestation occurred within oil palm, logging, mining, tree
plantation, or other industrial natural resource concessions (49,
50). Only 2% of this forest loss occurred within coal-mining
concessions (Fig. 4), although the rates of deforestation within
coal concessions are similar to those within other types of concession and the rates increase substantially when coal concessions overlap with other concessions (50). Much forest targeted
for investment is inhabited by and claimed by indigenous and
local communities (51).
Active coal mining affects 1.74 million ha of forest land according
to the Indonesian nongovernmental organization Auriga, and future
permits threaten 8.6 million ha, around 9% of Indonesia’s remaining
total forest cover (52). Over 1.1 million ha of designated “conservation” and “protection” forest is currently allocated to coal-mining
permits. Approximately 3.9 million ha of all coal-mining permits are
located in Papuan forests (SI Appendix, Fig. S2). Some 3.45 million
ha of Kalimantan’s forests are designated as coal-mining concessions. Over 45% of East and South Kalimantan has been allocated
for mining, mostly for coal, and between 2009 and 2011 onequarter of all deforestation in Kalimantan was due to the
clearance of forest within coal-mining concessions (53). ASGM is
also a growing threat to Indonesia’s forests, with approximately one
million ASGM miners across the archipelago (54, 55), with
particular concentrations in conservation areas. The strategic
environmental assessment of Indonesia’s 2011–2025 development
strategy, based on infrastructure and natural-resource extraction
concluded that the strategy could put US$490 billion of natural
capital at risk annually, although actual impacts were deemed
likely to be lower (56).
Mesoamerica. Across Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, only
0.96% of forest loss between 2001 and 2014 occurred in concessions
with operating mines. Conversely, the Cobre Panama concession

SUSTAINABILITY
SCIENCE

forests (20, 37, 39–42). However, the existing legal frameworks
for human rights and forest protection have consistently proven
insufficient to counter the sometimes violent claims to land and
resources, especially those made by more powerful actors in
concert with some elements within national and local governments (9, 10, 43).
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Fig. 4. Deforestation, extraction, and land use in Sumatra, Indonesia.

affects 13,600 ha of mostly dense rainforest (57). The mine and
associated infrastructure will increase Panama’s national GHG
emissions by 8% (58). Infrastructure–resource extraction interactions have driven forest loss in the Petén, Guatemala, where road
expansion, some directly related to oil extraction, has correlated
directly with forest clearing since the 1980s (59, 60). Local leaders
attribute forest loss to the rapid and uncontrolled settlement made
possible by these roads. Hydropower projects affect forested areas
and exacerbate tensions over environmental degradation and land
rights, as demonstrated by the violence and murder surrounding the
Aguas Zarcas hydroelectric conflict in Honduras in 2016.
Substantial areas of Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
and Panama are affected by mineral and hydrocarbon concessions
(Fig. 5 and SI Appendix, Fig. S3), and governments have passed
legislation promoting resource extraction. Mining concessions and
mining reserves in Nicaragua covered 10.5% of the national territory by 2015, with substantial overlaps with protected area forests
near the border with Honduras, including in the Bosawas Biosphere Reserve (61). A proposed natural gas pipeline connecting
US and Mexican gas supplies with Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador would cross communal lands and areas already concessioned for mining in the western portion of Guatemala, suggesting
13168 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1812505115

future synergies among infrastructure, resource extraction, and
forest loss (62).
Converging Patterns of Resource Extraction and Forest Loss. In the
period 2000–2014, the aggregate direct effects of mining and oil
and gas extraction on forest cover and quality were limited:
Overall, there is no clear spatial relationship between forest loss
and resource extraction. There are, however, important subnational exceptions to this pattern in the results noted above.
Particularly significant cases have included coal mining in
Sumatra and Kalimantan (49), iron ore mining and charcoal and
pig iron production in Brazil (30), and ASGM in Madre de Dios,
Peru (45, 63), along rivers in the Brazilian and Colombian
Amazon (64, 65), across Kalimantan (66), and in Nicaragua (67).
The indirect impact of resource extraction on forest loss exceeds the direct impact because of the interaction between resource extraction and infrastructure investment, which leads to
increased forest loss and extensive forest degradation. Access
infrastructure built for resource extraction increases the footprint of that extraction, enables in-migration of agricultural
colonists, and signals that the government intends for those areas
to be developed and settled. The Petén of Guatemala is a clear
Bebbington et al.
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Fig. 5.

Deforestation, extraction, and protected areas in Guatemala and Panama.

historical example of this relationship. The expansion of ASGM
in Madre de Dios accelerated with the construction of the
Southern Interoceanic Highway linking Brazil and Peru. Such
cases are relevant for the assessment of future pressures on
forest cover. While mining concessions in the northern edge of
the Brazilian state of Amazonas are currently not viable, planned
extension of waterways (Fig. 3 and SI Appendix) as part of
multimodal transport systems will reduce bulk transport costs
and increase pressure on Brazil’s largest areas of intact forest.
The designation of a “mining arc” covering 12% of national
territory on the Venezuelan side of the border and placed under
military control with the suspension of constitutional rights, may
also reduce barriers to mineral development in the region. In
Kalimantan, the enormous IndoMet coal concession will become
Bebbington et al.

viable if a planned rail link running through intact forest to a
coastal port is realized.
Such past and projected interactions between infrastructure
and expanded resource extraction speak to the impact of infrastructure on forest loss. Access and energy infrastructure have
consistently enabled the expansion of the large- and small-scale
agricultural frontier in forest areas. Agricultural conversion is
the proximate driver of forest loss (21, 68), while infrastructure
investment becomes “the driver of drivers” of forest loss. The
synergy between access infrastructure and agro-industrial expansion is also reflected in the lobbying activities of agricultural
investors. In Brazil, large-scale soybean farmers lobby directly for
the government to facilitate investment in waterways, rail, and
roads, and their representatives have become state governors,
PNAS | December 26, 2018 | vol. 115 | no. 52 | 13169

members of Parliament, and the Minister of Agriculture, positions from which they have continued to promote infrastructure
investment (69). The Lava Jato (Car Wash) scandal, which began
in Brazil but has led to legal proceedings against senior politicians and businesses across much of Latin America, has exposed
the pathways through which extraction and infrastructure offer
extensive opportunities for corruption and illegal behavior involving significant private capture of resource rents. While the
crisis has led to intensified demands for transparency in public–
private interactions, its adverse effect on investment induces
further pressure to weaken forest protections to facilitate additional extraction and infrastructure projects to fill these gaps in
public investment. This can also offer further opportunities for
corruption.
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Converging Drivers. Across Amazonia, Mesoamerica, and Indo-

nesia, similar policy drivers promote investments that will impact
forest cover and emissions. Interviews and workshops (SI Appendix) identified the following drivers as important: commitments to regional integration of energy systems and energy
security; a policy of economic growth based on the exploitation
and export of natural resources; commitments to large-scale
regional integration through infrastructure; policy, legal, and
regulatory reforms to facilitate investment in previously protected areas, particularly in indigenous peoples’ lands and conservation areas; and national elites committed to these models of
growth. While such policies are not new, their implications for
forests have become more serious: These drivers have already
driven forest loss in earlier decades, so the remaining forest that
they now threaten is substantially reduced in extent; the intensity
and ambition of such policies has increased as countries seek to
reach developed-country status; and in an attempt to grow out of
economic crisis, Brazil has promoted further natural resource
extraction in the Amazon. Globally, forest areas are being connected to new commodity markets, particularly in Asia, in
addition to existing connections to markets in the Western
Hemisphere.
Growth based on natural resources. Pressure on forest cover in these
regions is driven by growth policies based on the use, transformation, and extraction of natural resources. Indonesia’s
framework national development plan, the MP3EI issued in
2011, identified six “economic corridors” spread across the archipelago. In five of these corridors, growth and investment
strategies were oriented to focus on natural-resource industries
and infrastructure. In Brazil, the three phases of the government’s Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), launched in 2007
and running to 2018, emphasized the construction of highways,
waterways, and hydroelectric power plants, with most of these in
the Legal Amazon. In Mesoamerica, the Honduran government’s strategic plan for 2014–2018 identifies hydroelectric energy as an investment priority and calls for a plan to promote
investment in mining and petroleum exploration (70), while by
2016 gold had become one of Nicaragua’s top three exports, with
production concentrated along the edges of the forested Muskitia
and with concessions overlapping protected forests (61).
Infrastructure and regional integration. Each region has an explicit plan for
regional integration based on coordinated infrastructure investment.
The Amazon region lies at the heart of the former Initiative for the
Integration of Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA),
subsequently called “COSIPLAN” (South American Council for Infrastructure and Planning). IIRSA/COSIPLAN is a vision of multimodal transport systems integrating the continent and organized
around 10 axes, four of which run across the Amazon basin. Waterways, rail lines, and roads make up 72% of Brazil’s US$20 trillion
Agenda for Priority Integration Projects. The MP3EI in Indonesia,
now renamed but substantially similar under a new government,
envisages roads, railways, and bridges integrating the islands of the
archipelago. In Mesoamerica, the Mesoamerican Integration and
13170 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1812505115

Development Project (MIDP, formerly Plan Puebla-Panama) anticipates road- and energy-based integration of the isthmus, although in
this case much of the planned investment has a more urban focus. In
each region, planned infrastructure has synergistic relationships with
expansion of the agricultural and resource-extraction frontiers. The
role of infrastructure investment as a driver of forest-based emissions
cannot be separated from its implications for the expansion of agriculture and resource extraction.
Regulatory and legal reform. Efforts to create institutional environments that favor investment in resource extraction and infrastructure characterize each region and have intensified in
recent years (71, 72). After decades of efforts to establish social
and environmental protections, those protections are now viewed
as excessive obstructions to project approval. This effort to create
rules that favor investment is an attempt to increase competitiveness and the ease of doing business and thus offset the effects
of slowing rates of growth and falling commodity prices. It is also a
response to private-sector lobbying both for investment incentives
and for the weakening or elimination of sustainability safeguards.
One set of reforms in Brazil eases resource extraction and infrastructure investment in previously restricted areas. In 2016 there
were ∼140 proposals for legislative change in the Brazilian Congress
that would affect indigenous and other groups’ resource and territorial rights, including laws allowing mining investment inside these
territories. Other reforms include constitutional and legal changes
allowing private investment in Mexico’s hydrocarbon sector; Indonesian efforts to seek to improve the country’s ease of doing business
index and facilitate public–private partnerships; and Nicaraguan
legal reforms to ease the expropriation of land for large-scale investments in priority infrastructure.
Energy integration. Commitments to energy security through enhancing energy production and making possible its transmission
across large distances, with consequences for forest cover, are
apparent in all three regions. In Brazil, commitments to increase
the domestic energy supply motivate plans for broad-based expansion of hydroelectricity production across the Amazon basin,
although the future of these plans is now in some doubt (73). In
Indonesia, the goal of increasing domestic electricity provision by
35 GW before 2019, in addition to 8 GW of on-going projects
(74), includes substantial commitments to thermal power, and 38
GW of new coal plant capacity are either under construction or in
the pipeline between now and 2025 (although some are delayed).
This drives the demand for coal produced in Kalimantan and
Sumatra, complementing export demands. In Mesoamerica, the
possibility of a continuous link between the US and South
American energy grids, coupled with plans for gas pipelines and
hydropower, drive pressure on primary forest cover in the Darién
Peninsula linking Panama and Colombia (75, 76).
Political settlements. Commitments to the above policy drivers have
been relatively constant across governments of different persuasions. This suggests that behind these drivers are stable political settlements that transcend particular administrations (77,
78). While such settlements are hard to identify other than
through their effects, the recently exposed network of corruption
in Brazil and beyond has revealed how elites made agreements
regarding the systematic, illegal distribution of benefits that were
made possible by the sustained promotion of infrastructure investment and hydrocarbon extraction throughout Latin America
(79). In Indonesia, the commitment to significant expansion of
coal-based energy likewise transcends periods of government
and reflects an agreement among economic and political elites to
support increased coal mining in forested areas by investing in
thermal electricity-generating plants (80, 81).
Conclusion and Implications for Sustainability Science
What happens to the forests of Amazonia, Indonesia, and
Mesoamerica over the next two decades will depend on which
claims over these forests prevail in these contests about land use.
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and understand the causal relations through which such asymmetries have these effects and lead to policy that favors forest
loss, and (ii) to generate knowledge in ways that offset asymmetries. This implies conducting research in ways that contribute
to (i) change in the terms of public debate about forests and
forest communities, and (ii) the capacities and credibility of
those institutions that defend the rights of forest users.
In the regions discussed in this paper, this finding suggests the
value of collaboration with nontraditional partners [e.g., the
Public Ministry and the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) in
Brazil, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in
Indonesia, human rights defenders’ offices in Mesoamerica, legal
defense and indigenous rights organizations in civil society, and
constitutional courts in all regions] in efforts to combat climate
change. Sustainability transitions in these regions have as much
need of institutions and resources to protect forest defenders
and the professionals and organizations supporting them as
they do of expert commissions to measure and model emissions releases. Collaborations with civil society research observatories that monitor interactions between resource extraction
and infrastructure investment flows, forest governance, forest
cover and tenure, and human rights are also important and can
build on the work of existing research centers in each region,
some of whose work is cited here. Such observatories can also
identify and publicize financially unviable or pork-barrel projects.
Research collaborations can build mutual capacities, share data,
enhance visibility, and, where needed, provide backing in the
face of political pushback. Concerted efforts to examine successful responses to address pressures on forests would offer the
possibility for rigorous lesson-learning and broader policy and
conceptual relevance. In the Amazon alone, examples of such
responses include grassroots organizing and litigation in Sao
Luis do Tapajos, indigenous and environmentalist organizations’
prevention of hydroelectric projects proposed under the PeruBrazil Energy Agreement, and conservation-based initiatives
such as the Amazon Region Protected Areas Program and
REDD Indígena.
The protection of forests and forest peoples’ rights also requires new and different approaches to development (84) that
prioritize these objectives while accommodating some resourceextraction and agroindustry priorities. Elements of such a model
will include rigorous land-use zoning setting aside forest areas
and forest-dependent community territory; energy-security strategies not based on removing coal from forest areas and involving
reduced dam building and fossil fuel extraction; community-based
forest management drawing on well-documented experiences, especially across Latin America (45, 85, 86); financial instruments for
the reduction of forest conversion; commodity-chain regulation to
promote responsible production (87, 88) coupled with the reassertion of social and environmental safeguards on investment; and a
substantial community and human rights agenda. Land use futures
in forest areas depend on whose land rights are enforced, and which
land-rights defenders and proponents prevail. This in turn requires
particular ways of conducting Sustainability Science that enable
such an agenda while retaining legitimacy and credibility with largescale resource extraction, infrastructure, and agroindustry investors
as well as helping imagine futures in which no more forest is lost,
violence against forest defenders ceases, and large-scale investment
can secure at least some of its objectives. In this vision, Sustainability Science becomes a process of knowledge generation and
constituency building as well as a powerful tool for reducing the
historic inequalities of access and power that are a significant underlying driver for forest loss.

SUSTAINABILITY
SCIENCE

Forests cannot simultaneously serve as a frontier for further
expansion of natural resource-based macroeconomic development, a global carbon sink, a source of livelihood and meaning
for forest-dependent communities, and the refuge of increasingly
threatened biodiversity. Among these different claims on forests,
those from mining, hydrocarbon, and infrastructure-facilitated
agro-industrial expansion appear likely to expand further into
remaining forest stands if current drivers persist. This expansion
reflects expressed policy commitments by national governments
of different ideological persuasions, the asymmetric relations of
power that influence policy definition, and sustained international demand for minerals, hydrocarbons, energy, palm oil,
soybeans, and beef.
Contentions over land use and the extent to which the rights of
forest defenders are protected are an integral part of determining
which forms of land use prevail. Models that assess the influence
of protected areas, indigenous territories, land-use consultations,
and other institutions on land-cover change all make an implicit
assumption that there are human agents who are capable of and
are supported in implementing such institutions. If these human
agents are subject to violence, intimidation, and murder, then such
institutions will neither emerge nor persist and so will fail to affect
land-cover change. The implication is that models of land-cover
change and forest loss must incorporate questions of rights protection, impunity, and the rule of law alongside analysis of patterns of resource extraction and infrastructure.
This context presents a challenge to Sustainability Science. As
the discipline has grown, tropical forest loss and resurgence have
been among its primary concerns. However, this rich body of
work on deforestation and the associated policy recommendations focus far more on agriculture and forestry than on resource
extraction or associated large-scale infrastructure (82). There is
even less analysis of the types of social and political relationships
that have been created by these large-scale investments and
which become self-perpetuating through lobbying and the reentrenchment of power relations. To the extent that Sustainability
Science is a discipline explicitly committed to outcomes that
promote human and environmental flourishing, violations of
such rights should feature more explicitly in its analyses of forests
for normative reasons. These themes should also receive greater
attention for analytical reasons. They are integral parts of the
explanation of forest dynamics.
At the same time, Sustainability Science is grounded in core
principles: that securing sustainability requires bridging among
knowledge systems; that science should influence policy promoting sustainability; and that this requires that science be salient, credible, and legitimate to the range of stakeholders who
influence policy formation (83). In the relationships among resource extraction, infrastructure investment, and community
rights in forested lands, these stakeholders have distinct and
often opposed interests as well as unequal power to pursue those
interests. In such a context, Sustainability Science may be able to
secure credibility (by pursuing methods that different stakeholders can agree are defensible) and legitimacy (by maintaining
independence and at the same time being transparent to each
stakeholder). However, achieving salience with all stakeholders
is more difficult, given that these stakeholders often have divergent views regarding the future use and governance of forests.
The challenge is to conduct research oriented toward the protection of forest cover and community rights without being cast
as either anti- or prodevelopment. Future sustainability will require
roads, minerals, and energy, but it will also require extensive primary forests and biodiversity and, by definition, requires a flourishing of human rights.
Asymmetries of power among stakeholders drive forest loss
and systematically disadvantage those users whose impact on
forests is much lighter. This challenges Sustainability Science and
its component parts such as Land Change Science (i) to analyze
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